aicher on design
science, including applied science, seeks generalizable knowledge and general principles, whereas design pursues objects that are concrete and precise. design is an »art« in the sense of skill, like politics, pedagogy, surgery, or business management. there is no question that these skills include scientific training today. however, they are not knowledge based. design proves itself in the ad-hoc decision on the individual object, not in the establishment of the truth. its goal and its canon is the individual product result. in this respect, science and design are divergent activities, as the former leads to abstraction, the latter to a concrete case. the thought process is also different in both. science proceeds from deduction to deduction; it draws conclusions. design is a drafting activity at the end of which there is not a conclusion, but a conception, which was built on ideas. drafting and rules also are inherently different. a realization can be true or false — right or wrong. design, on the other hand, is based on the criteria of proof and integrity. like any other skill, it proves itself in the success of its application. if one is aware of the nearly contradictory nature of science and design, one will be able to start to build a meaningful classification and to include it in pedagogy. then one will no longer confuse examples of the application of scientific methodology with design activity, just as one once mistook the drawing of classical models for art. design will be taught by design as a process that has more to do with invention than investigation. at the same time, it will be important to incorporate available knowledge into design activity and to maintain methodological accuracy, as long as possible and always remembering that designing is a conceptual activity that does not adhere to the boundaries of the spheres of knowledge. the world does not only want to be known, but also made. not all science is the same. in recent years, scientific methods at the hfg were only tolerated as scientific insofar as they were based on mathematical-statistical principles and their results were quantifiable. qualitative methods, which focus on the »what«, »why« and »wherefore« of a process, were suspect. they were too heavily based on subjectivity, intuition and interpretation. the imprecise descriptive and indiscernible procedures did not satisfy the demand for accuracy in quantitative observation.
design, however, is directly based on a sense of reason and purpose, neither of which can be supported by statistical-mathematical methods. today, the designer can hardly work without data collection and data processing. yet collecting facts does not give any explanation regarding demands and requirements. facts must be included in the design, but a conception does not result from facts. design consists of interpreting them, of integrating them into a concept that is not content with the fact that something exists, but rather why and for what purpose. in this respect, value should be placed on the qualitative presentation of facts. statistical-mathematical methods were regarded as so universal that items became interchangeable. the objects to be designed became ho-hum. design was now in an application of methods. such an imprudence, which was not common even for scientists, negated all epistemological values resulting from individual situations and cases. the general methodically fixed model was equated with reality. the knowledge of the specific and the particular were deregulated. this methodological fetishism is not something unique to the hfg. it has become part of a wide variety of disciplines in a wide variety of places. it just does not seem to be as persistent there. after all, the hfg can be counted among the institutions where its lack of results has been proven. the design results achieved after this process are in inverse proportion to the high ambition. no designs emerged — only information on how they should proceed. thus, a gap and a one-sided shift in the programs of those scientific disciplines that seem to be necessary as prerequisites for design education became apparent. nothing is more welcome to students who are entering a field, which is still unknown to them, than an exactness of means that can be drawn out into a recipe. clarity is especially captivating for the beginner. problems only become evident to the fully initiated. now, the advantage of the natural sciences actually lies in their exact methods. a scientific interpretation of design is absolute. problematic. nevertheless, a sociological or economic interpretation can be more precise and at the same time inexact. precision is what counts though. frequently, exactness becomes inaccurate when it becomes self perpetuating.
excerpt from spitz, r. (2012) aicher in ulm. ulm. link: https://renespitz.de/hans-g-conrad-aicher-in-ulm/
the didactic difficulties that arise from such circumstances are considerable. in any case, it is not surprising that a simple, exact approach is more popular at first than a complex one that admits to its shortcomings. the most convincing argument for a scientific-mathematical concept of design is probably the appeal to the value-free nature of the observation. the demand for objectivity is complicated. it captivates us in the same way a proposal of an exact methodical concept does. in fact, the demand for value-free observation in science is plausible. restraint in evaluation is virtually a prerequisite for determining insight. then even in the social sciences, value-free observation is only provisionally tenable. they presume set values and value systems. even the natural sciences are committed to the value system of value-free observation and to the demand for determining the social implications of their research results. they, too, have a moral dimension. design is, to a large extent, a response and thus a moral activity. it is based on both cultural and social values. it is based on objectives, evaluations and commitment. otherwise, it must degenerate into opportunistic styling. design stands in a pedagogical position from the outset. it does not design what is wanted but what should be. freedom from values is designs inherent task, whereby it does not matter whether it is sacrificed to the market, the public's liking or corporate strategy. due to the circumstances of its founding, the hfg had a high moral standard from the very beginning. the fact that it was not codified can not mean that it did not exist. consequently, it will have to cease to exist if it is not constantly reflected in applications, or if it is attacked for programmatic reasons. cultural, in particular, aesthetic requirements were just as demanding. the abandonment of this standard, as can be observed everywhere, reverses the high principle contained in the demand for value-free design. value-free design becomes valueless. design is a moral, i.e. evaluative activity based on a cultural and social value system. this results in the necessity for a precise design doctrine. can the school of design thus be put on equal footing with scientific universities? a declared goal of a scientific university is not to impart practical training and not to teach skills. an individual object is — from a scientific point of view - worthless. accordingly, the hfg cannot be equated with the scientific university. a school of design is oriented towards the individual object. it facilitates practical training and trains skills. it was fatal to start from incorrect comparisons. the hfg cannot be an open school in the sense that different design standpoints could be united under one roof in the same way it must be required of scientific universities. of course, there are individually different emphases and evaluations. the teaching staff of the hfg had, in principle, been united in the past. it would have to become so again in the future. appointments can only be based on fundamental agreement with the design concept; carved out by teaching and example. applying the principles of academic freedom, which is valid at scientific universities, means, in the case of the hfg, to confuse the essence of different institutions. academic freedom at the hfg is limited by the framework of a cultural and social conception, which is considered an obligation, because the entire institution was founded for this. openness and freedom are relativized to a direction and a course, the success of which, moreover, has been confirmed in design practice and has led to international recognition. important cultural institutions, be they schools such as the bauhaus or significant theaters, develop in their exclusivity. a school that offers something to everyone is conceivable, but develops neither impetus nor exemplarity. it is precisely cultural competition that requires institutions with a program and principles. yet is there an authority that a school of this kind must have in order to guarantee its further development?